COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION OR COURT APPLICATION OF COMMON LAW RULES OF MARKETING? by STURGES, WESLEY A.
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION OR COURT
APPLICATION OF COMMON LAW
RULES OF MARKETING?1
WESLEY A. STURGES.
Mr. Justice Holmes has referred to a "noble instinct of scientific
curiosity to understand why we maintain what now is." "But," he adds,
"most even of the enlightened reformers that I hear or read seem to
me . . . to become rhetorical just where I want figures."'2
" It is the purpose of this paper, first: to raise the question why, in
the light of facts and figures, we have certain common law rules that
affect the activity of marketing goods, and second: to ascertain to
what extent these rules are, and may continue to be, what Professor
Commons3 calls actual "working rules" in the business community.
Suppose a shipper consigns provisions to X, who receives them on
a term-credit, but refuses to pay the agreed purchase price on the due
date. If the shipper considers court action in New York he should
be advised that he cannot have a trial of the issues before the first
of 1929 if the case is docketed at once (extraordinary cases advanced
on certificates of special importance excepted). On January I, 1924,
according to figures of Mr. Justice Guy of the New York Supreme
Court,' the trial calendars of the New York Supreme Court con-
tained over 27,ooo untried cases. With the judicial machinery operat-
ing at-top speed, and counting outside settlements and discontinuances,
somewhere between eight and ten thousand cases can be disposed of
in a year.5 The 1924 figures just quoted also show that the annual
addition to the calendars is between ten and fifteen thousand new
cases. This is the situation in New York while the taxpayers main-
'The principal part of this article was read at a round table conference of the
commercial law section of the American Law School Association at its annual
meeting at Chicago, December 29, 1924. The conference discussed legal problems
in marketing.
The writer wishes to make acknowledgment to Mr. John Caskey for assis.
tance in collecting the facts set forth in this paper.
'Holmes, "Introduction, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions" (1923) Modern
Legal Phil. Series.
'Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (1924) 134, 140.
'Reported in New York Evening Post, Dec. 13, 1924.
'No extensive figures are available to the writer bearing on the ratio of
cases taken off the records by outside settlement or discontinuance and cases
carried through court action. The Superior Court of New Haven County,
Connecticut, is reported to have disposed of 1505 cases during the year ending
September i, i924. Of this number 346 were discontinuances, 307 withdrawn




tain 35 Supreme Court justices, 30 Municipal Court justices and IO
City Court justices.
In the United States Federal courts the congestion is similar. On
June 3o, 1924, cases waiting for trial in the United States Federal
District courts on the civil docket, exclusive of bankruptcy, numbered
fifty-six thousand thirty-two, and on the criminal docket, excluding
cases under the draft, forty thousand two hundred and ten-a total
of ninety-six thousand two hundred and forty-two untried cases. As
for the Federal Courts of Appeals, the Court of Claims and Territorial
Appellate Court figures are unavailable to the writer, but he is informed
that the number of their untried cases is negligible. The Supreme
Court had 462 cases pending on the above date.6
General consequences of this delay of trial cohrts, which is experi-
enced in varying degree in most, if not all, jurisdictions, are stated
in the following seemingly rhetorical but, unfortunately, all too accu-
rate summary: "rights suffer irreparable wrong; wrongs go unrighted;
parties and witnesses die, scatter and disappear; evidence is lost or
destroyed; memories fail and testimony loses its distinct value; frauds
and perjuries evolve and are matured; insolvencies and bankruptcies
intervene, so that when the tardy day of judicial trial drags the often
seriously weakened case to the bar of justice, justice ofttimes cannot
be had or is very ineffective. ' 7
Let us look at the shipper's position a little more in detail. If he
must rely upon the courts to enforce his claim, the delay just mentioned
indicates the minimum time that the purchase price will be idle capital
'For certain consequences of this pressure of cases, not elsewhere to be par-
ticularly noted in this article, the following should be quoted from Dean Pound:
".... the condition of pressure under which causes are passed upon in the Ameri-
can urban communities of to-day where crowded calendars preclude the
thoroughness in presentation and deliberation in judicial study which were pos-
sible a century ago, prevents judicial law making from achieving its best. An
example from the law reports will make clear what this means. In 4 Wheaton's
Reports, reporting the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
during the year i81, decisions in thirty-three cases are reported. In other
words, seven judges decided thirty-three cases in that year. In 248-251 United
States Reports, we may see the work of that court a hundred years later. In
1919 the court wrote two hundred and forty-two opinions and disposed of six
hundred and sixty-one cases. If we look only at the opinions written, where
seven judges wrote thirty-three opinions in i8ig, nine judges wrote two hundred
and forty-two opinions in 1919 .... This does not mean merely that the judges
are compelled to work rapidly and with a minimum of deliberation. In order to
hear these cases at all the time allowed to counsel must be greatly abridged...
In state courts the pressure has become even greater. Thus at a time when
constructive work of the highest order is demanded . . . in many of our states
the courts are none too well equipped to do the work effectively and in all of
them the pressure. of business is such that work of the highest type is all but
precluded." Pound, The Spirit of the Common. Law (1921) 8, 9.
'Wheless, Arbitration as a Judicial Process of Law (1924) 30 W. VA. L.
QUART. 209.
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for the shipper and additional capital for the buyer. For our shipper
it means the loss of gross-profit earning power. According to investi-
gations of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration,
Bureau of Business Research, the capital-dollar of a wholesaler of
groceries and provisions has a gross-profit-earning-power ranging
from a low of 7.7oto a high of 17.27--common, 12.o%. A retail
grocer's capital has a gross-profit-earning-power ranging from 14.67
to :27.9%--common, 2I.O%. These figures are taken from a busi-
ness where, due to highly competitive conditions, it is believed that
the margin of gross profit is particularly fow. 8 For the delay period
of the courts, our shipper is deprived of this gross earning power of
the purchase price-the buyer has it.
But it may be suggested that when judgment is procured, interest,
at the legal rate, may be allowed on the price from due date. Assum-
ing this to be the rule-an assumption not entirely free from doubt and
conditions according to the authorities-it will help some.9  However,
this legal interest-rate is 6% in New York and in other states averages
below 77.1 °  So far as this allowance at such rates is supposed to
reimburse the shipper for loss of opportunity to use the money as
capital or to take from the buyer its capital-use-value to him, it appears
to be an inadequate adjustment. On the other hand, it may be urged
that this interest allowance is not "on the legal theory" of reimburs-
ing for the capital-use-loss of the purchase price nor to take from
the defaulting buyer its capital-use-value to him, but rather is "on the
legal theory" of indemnifying the shipper for the interest which he
must pay on that amount of further capital borrowed to replace the
item in question. The validity of this theory depends upon the facts
of the particular case. If his lines of credit were not already taken
on the due date this legal theory is sound. If his maximum credit
position was taken, obviously the allowance is on a fallacious assump-
tion; it is then only a makeshift adjustment. Whether or not it was
taken presents a question of fact. As a "long run" proposition, how-
ever, it may be suggested that if his enterprise is profitable the shipper
would be using his maximum credit, for his way to profits is by busi-
ness volume (assuming the enterprise is non-monopolistic). If the
business is not profitable of course he is generally without commercial
credit. Our shipper will refer to his books in this matter; the courts
decide "on principle"--as a matter of law."
'See Kirshman, Principles of Investment (1924) ch. IV--"The Return to
Invested Capital."
'2 Sutherland, Damages (4th ed. 1916) sec. 642.
"'In 6 states the "legal rate of interest" is 8%; in 7 states, 7%; in 32 states,
6%; in 3 states, 5%. The rate for which parties may bargain in the different
states varies much more.
ni Sutherland, Damages (4th ed. 1916) sec. 76: "Money, like the staples of
commerce, is, in legal contemplation, always in market and procurable at the
lawful rate of interest; and the same principle which limits a disappointed
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Furthermore, we may refer to the loss consequent upon this delay
of the law, which obtains in perishable and semi-perishable commodities
where, for example, they are not accepted by the consignee. If both
parties are obstinate and stick to their legal rights the provisions may
rot. The New York Chamber of Commerce puts this loss in terms
of "many millions annually."' 2 While this statement is unaccom-
panied by any table of figures, it seems probable that some such waste
does occur.
So far we have considered consequences of the "law's delay," as
the aphorism goes, as if it ran only to a probable date of trial. But
probabilities of extended trials, appeals, new trials and further appeals,
and costs incident to employment of counsel, printing of records, com-
missions to procure evidence, are matters of common knowledge. Cer-
tainly the record to date in the Willett-Herrick case in Massachusetts
is not out of place in this connection as indicating possibilities in trial
court practice. Thirteen months (187 days actual trial days) have
been spent by the Norfolk Superior Court in Dedham in trying a claim
for $I5,ooo,ooo. Testimony to the extent of 30 volumes of 350 pages
each was taken from 45 witnesses. There were 954 exhibits. One
juryman was excused by consent of both parties on account of nervous
breakdown. The remaining ii returned a verdict for $I0,534,IO9.07.
They did so within 72 hours. The jury consisted of four clerks.
one stonemason, one printer, one railway employee, one carpenter, one
machinist, one painter, one retired minister and one shoemaker.
3
So far reference has been made to these costs, losses and w~iste,
if they may be so described, apparently from the point of view of.
the entrepreneur, our shipper. But lest we appear to be worshipping
at the altar of the great god Business, they should be traced, if possible,
to their final resting place. Do they stop with the entrepreneur?
vendee's recovery against his defaulting vendor to the market value of the
commodity which is the subject of his contract restricts the creditor to the
principal and interest."
12 A circular memorandum dated Dec. 2o, 1923, sponsoring a Federal Arbitra-
tion Bill, Sen. Rep. 1005, House Rep. 646.
'The New York World of Dec. 28, 1924, makes this further report of the
case: "The cost of the long trial, which had to be borne by the one city and
twenty-seven towns of Norfolk County, is estimated at $5oooo. Of this the
payments to the jurors for their thirteen months of service accounted for
$2o,ooo. The stenographers cost $3,790; the making of the transcript of testi-
mony, $3,345, and the salaries of the court officials, $5,6o5.
What the cost of the eminent counsel retained by both sides over so long a
period may total has not been revealed. But there is no doubt it has been an
eminently satisfying case from the point of view of the bar and that its poten-
tialities are by no means exhausted. Judge Callahan gave the attorneys almost
six months, instead of the customary twenty days, to make up their bill of
exceptions. It is hardly probable that a brief for the defense can be prepared
before Nov. 1, 1925, or that the Supreme Court of Massachusetts will reach a
decision on the appeal much before Nov. i, 925. (?) So the case bids fair to
run on for at least two years longer."
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Can the observation be made validly, that if they did, having regard
for scales of net profits, that the entrepreneur function, as we now
know it, would become defunct? That accounting technique carries
these costs or losses on to the consumer will not be denied. That the
process of marketing is fitted for that end will not be denied. That
the consumer can bear it if he must is probably true. Whether he
does or does not the writer can scarcely prove, so an answer to the
question is left to inference.".
But what bearing do These data on the glutted conditions of the
courts, and the question of costs and losses incident to delayed trials
and protracted litigation generally, have to do with rules of the common
law courts that affect distribution? It seems fitting in this connection to
refer to that rule established by the courts which has effectively dis-
abled entrepreneurs from accomplishing a program of their own for
adjusting their disputes arising in the market. Business men have
devised such programs--the one most frequently recurring in evidence
being that of arbitration. American courts have quite uniformly
declared that any such general agreement is against public policy and
invalid in so far as it undertakes to "oust the courts of justice of
jurisdiction."' 5 This rule has always enabled one party, whatever his
motive, to escape to the interstices of a common law court trial whether
in' former days they were found in the technical forms of action and
vagaries of pleadings and proof and tactics of practitioners, or in
modem days in congested trial calendars and some modem counsel
still gallant with technicalities.
The formula of the rule has been, as stated, that as an agreement
to "oust the courts from jurisdiction" it is invalid. In this doctrine
American courts have been ruled from the grave of Vynior's Case
decided in 1609.16 There, when the notionfs of agency were yet form-
ing, it was resolved that "a man cannot by his act make such authority,
power or warrant not countermandable, which is by the law and of
its own nature countermandable." The modem dress was not given
to the dogma until Kill v. Hollister,17 where it was resolved by the
whole court in a report of less than four lines that "if there had been
"'In the circular memorandum of the New York Chamber of Commerce,
supra note 12, appears the following statement: "The Bill (for a Federal
Commercial Arbitration Statute) on the one hand, aims to eliminate friction,
delay and waste, and on the other, to establish and maintain business amity and
to reduce the price of commodities to the consumer; this latter on the theory
that a merchant in figuring his cost adds to his price a certain amount represent-
ing the risk of rejection, claims, fault-finding, etc., even including litigation."
"To agree to arbitrate in such cases is valid'in most states to the extent of
imposing a duty to arbitrate, a breach of which will 'support an action for
damages, nominal damages being awarded. See 3 Williston, Contracts (1921)
secs. 1719-1724.
18 (1572) 8 Coke, Rep. Sib. See Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration
and the New York Statute (1921) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 147; also Cohen,
Cotnmercial Arbitration and the Law (x918).
'a (1746, K. B.) I Wils. 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 532.
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a reference depending, or made and determined, it might have been
at Bar, but the agreement of the parties cannot oust this Court; and as
no reference has been, nor any is depending, the action is well brought,
and the plaintiff must have judgment." The English courts long ago
effectively overcame the rule.18
In the light of the facts which have been reviewed concerning
modern conditions, and with the history of common law actions and
pleadings and their costs and delays in mind together with the origins
of the rule as indicated, I will merely raise the question: what public
policy is or ever was violated by business men agreeing to settle their
commercial disputes in their own back yards? 19 If an adjustment
can be made at less cost, loss and waste, how will the consumer react?
Whether business men generally desire to engage in such a program
is another question, a question of fact to be considered later.
Let us turn to another rule, rather group of rules, with which the
entrepreneur finds fault. He complains that these rules unnecessarily
demoralize his enterprise as a going concern. He alleges that the
courts in these cases appear to have the erroneous idea that every
business transaction is vitalized by an assumption of the parties thereto
that evidence is then being made for a future lawsuit between them.
Suppose that (at trial) our shipper is put to proof of the delivery
of the goods. Records of a cbmmon carrier are not available. How
shall he proceed under the law? The shipper explains that his books
show shipment. He desires to use them for that purpose. He says
that his books are accurately kept-he urges two reasons why: (i)
that the clerks are anxious to maintain their efficiency rating, and
(2) that in the modern business enterprise the management is so highly
dependent upon its many employees that to instruct them in falsifica-
tion of books would be business suicide. Our shipper explains further
that the given items were only a portion of his production volume
and that it passed through the hands of many employees-through
the warehouse of finished goods, through the inspection department,
the packing department, another inspection department perhaps,
through a shipping department and finally out into the hands of dray-
men. Various employees in the various departments accomplish some
part of the accompanying record for the proprietor's "books." The
is3 Williston, Contracts (1921) sec. i72o; cf. Doleman & Sons v. Osset Corp.
[1912] 3 K. B. 257, 68.
"For a searching criticism of the assignment of reasons for this rule see
Hough, J., in, United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum
Co., Ltd. (1915, S. D. N. Y.) 222 Fed. ioo6, ioo8: "It has never been denied
that the hostility of English-speaking courts to arbitration contracts probably
originated [as Lord Campbell said in Scott v. Avery (1855) 5 H. L. Cas. 811]-
'in the contests ,of the courts of ancient times for extension of jurisdiction-all
of them being opposed to anything that would altogether deprive every one of
them of jurisdiction.' A more unworthy genesis cannot be imagined. Since
(at the latest) the time of Lord Kenyon, it has been customary to stand rather
upon the antiquity of the rule than upon its excellence or reason: .... "
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"books" show the course of the items and their "clearances" from one
operation and department to another. Of course the employees took
no special notice of these particular items which passed in the routine
of production some four or more years ago if the case is at trial in
New York (probably a lesser period elapses in most state courts).
But are his books so admissible in evidence on this issue of delivery?
There are some long standing principles to consider first before the
question can be answered. These, principles originated several hun-
dred years ago but shall they be discounted because of changed con-
ditions? What are these principles? (i) That testimonial evidence
must be by the person who saw and knows-a "hearsay rule" demands
this, subject to exceptions. (2) The right to cross examination of a
witness under oath must remain inviolate. But there are exceptions
to these principles. For example, a witness with no present recollec-
tion of past events may employ a record correctly made by himself
substantially contemporaneously with the event to revivify recollection
of the event, or to "refresh his memory" as the expression goes. This
exception, according to cases cited by Mr. Wigmore, rests on the prin-
ciple of necessity. Apparently we are now approaching close to the
question at hand in the process of color-matching. If in legal theory
the above exception is valid, certainly our shipper's books are admis-
sible with the testimony of the clerks who made the entries-and the
cases are to this effect. "But," says the shipper, "must all of my
employees appear? This event happened several years ago. My
employees never had vivid impressions of these items, and they have
certainly faded since the day. Some of them are no longer in my
employ and I do not know their whereabouts. Some who doubtlessly
made parts of these records have been promoted; others have been
reassigned according to their particular adaptation since we had the
psychological tests; others are dead. I doubt if I can ascertain which
part of the records were accomplished by any particular employee."
What is the answer? The decisions are in notorious chaos. In some
jurisdictions in some of their cases it would appear that the books
may be entered by the principal" officer in charge of the accounts; in
other cases in many of the same jurisdictions, as well as in other states
the clerks must appear en masse, and having been duly prompted as
to which part of the records they accomplished, are to testify as to
what happened years ago concerning the items in question. Of course
handwriting may help, assuming that they did not go to business col-
lege and learn the same system of handwriting. If some of the clerks
are dead, or insane, or by some cases if they are not readily available
in the jurisdiction, some courts are more readily inclined to strain
principles and admit the records, other courts are quite as obstinate
as in other cases. I refer to section 1530 of Mr. Wigmore's work
on Evidence for a monument of patient labors with the confusion of
decisions both with and without statutory provisions being involved.
20
"3 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 1530.
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"Lastly," urges our shipper, "even if all of my available employees
who had contact with my books must go to court, certainly it is
permissible to have made authenticated copies of material portions of
the records so that the originals will be left in the shop for current use."
Of course our shipper is entirely too naive' on this point. Books, the
originals, must go, and go complete-the "best evidence rule" is man-
datory, and it makes no difference whether the trial lasts one day or
extends over a period of thirteen months perhaps. In the business
community this aspect of administration of the law is irritating indeed.
There an enterpriser's books have validity, they serve as the basis of
business enterprise and calculations (specifically, reference may be
made to credit insurance)--even the tax collector is credulous respect-
ing them.
In this connection I will cite the following experience of a New
York firm of lawyers substantially as it is reported.21 Defendants
were sued on a guaranty of a bill of goods sold by plaintiff to X cor-
poration, of which defendants were officers. The corporation admitted
delivery and had given notes. But defendants' counsel made the
usual denial of knowledge. Plaintiff was obliged to .gather up a score
of former employees in a New Jersey factory since abandoned, to
bring on others from his Pennsylvania factory and spent two days
in proof of what every one knew to be a fact. Continuing the report:
during the course of the trial defendants' counsel discovered one order
out of more than one hundred that had been manufactured by plain-
tiff in his Kentucky factory. Plaintiff abandoned its claim of between
six and seven hundred dollars rather than bring on the necessary
Kentucky employees and records. 'Compare the English practice where
in absence of affidavit of non-delivery by defendant's counsel, and
satisfying the court that a real dispute obtains regarding delivery pre-
emptory judgment goes for the plaintiff on the point.
Let us take another case. Suppose that our shipper finds that a
letter written by him to the defaulting buyer will serve his side of the
case. He has a copy and is confident that defendant received the
original, but how prove it?
I again quote from Mr. Ehrich (cited above) .who has had exper-
ience with this matter in New York: "The law requires that before
the letter can be admitted in evidence, it must be traced to the mail
chute, letter box or post office. The sender must call the secretary
whose duty it was to take the letter from his desk and the office boy
who stamped and mailed it and have them testify that they performed
their duties on that day as on every other. If the secretary and office
boy are still in the employ of the sender and the office is in the
vicinity of the court house, the matter is merely tedious and stupid.
Actually, however, lawsuits are not generally anticipated. When they
do arise they often involve transactions dating back for many
" Ehrich, Unnecessary Difficulties of Proof (1922) 32 YALE LAW jouRNAL,
436, 437.
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years. Of course if the secretary and office boy are available, they
will testify that as far as they remember they performed their duties on
the particular day as on every other day. Presumably the letter was
mailed. If it was mislaid by oversight, neither the office boy oi secre-
tary would be aware of it. If one of them suppressed the letter de-
liberately and fraudulently, apparently he would, no doubt, hide his
guilt. If the letter was written only to make a record and then sup-
pressed, that purpose could easily be accomplished without their
knowledge." 22 If the office boy or secretary or both are dead, they
need not testify. If their unavailability, is for cause short of death,
the rule appears to have a confusion of exceptions in the various states
as to when their testimony may be dispensed with.
But assuming that the employees are at hand, have been discovered
again, or that their testimony can be dispensed with under an excep-
tion to the rule requiring their presence, I will quote from a Georgia
case of recent date for a prescription of the circumspection with which
one must walk in some jurisdictions to prove that the letter was
"mailed." The witness testified that he "mailed" the letter. The
opinion of the court follows: "There are some authorities which hold
that the word 'mailed,' when used in reference to sending matter
through the mails of the United States carries with it the presumption
that the postage due on such matter has been paid. But in National
Bldg. Assoc. v. Quin (19o4) I2O Ga. 358, that meaning does
not seem to be given to the word 'mailed,' it being there used to describe
the mere act of depositing a letter in the mails. In this sense there
might be such a thing as the mailing of an unstamped letter. . . .There
was evidence that at least one of fhe letters was properly addressed
and that both were deposited in the mail, but the evidence is silent
as to whether they were duly stamped. '2  Although the court states
that "the jresumption that a letter has been received when intrusted
to the mail for delivery arises from the regularity in the method of
business adopted by the postal authorities," it seems to have been more
concerned here in defining the word "mailed" than in referring to
further postal regulations, which are here assumed to be generally
known, adopted to assure delivery of the unstamped letter to the ad-
dressee or return thereof to the sender. Perhaps, however, we should
say that counsel were at fault for riot "laying proper foundations."
Further consideration of the rules of law affecting business corre-
spondence will not be undertaken. Reference may be had to Mr.
' Supra note 2I, at p. 440.
"Bankers" Mutual Casualty Co. v. People's Bank (19o7) 127 Ga. 326, 56 S.
E. 429; W. T. Raleigh Medical Co. v. Burneycal (i9IS) 22 Ga. App. 492, 96
S. E. 578. See also Welsh v. Chicago Guaranty Fund Life Society (899) 81
Mo. App. 30, 36; Glaser v. Williansburg City Fire Ins. Co. (i92o) 72 Ind. App.
319, 125 N. E. 787. Contra: Oregon Steamship Co. v. Otis (1885) 0o N. Y.
446, 3 N. E. 485; City of Omaha v. Yancey (iq12) 91 Neb. 26r, 135 N. W. 1o44;
Brooks, Boardinan & Ford v. Day (i86o) Ii Iowa, 46; Town of Barnet v.
Town of Norton (I916) go Vt. 544, 99 AtI. 238.
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Ehrich's article already cited and quoted at length. One cannot refrain,
however, from reviewing Hawley v. Whipple (1869) 48 N. H. 487,
which appears to recite the orthodox limitations prescribed by the
courts for proving telegrams. It became material for the plaintiff
to prove that a telegram was sent by one Gould in Montreal to plain-
tiff in Northumberland, N. H. Plaintiff sought to show this by a
reply telegram purporting to come from Gould following soon after
a telegram sent by plaintiff to Gould in Montreal. The reply was
apparently satisfactorily understood and acted upon by plaintiff. Held,
properly excluded. The court says: "Now it is claimed that, as in
case of a letter, so in case of telegraphic dispatches the person who
answers a dispatch is so generally and uniformly the person to whom
the communication was addressed that it may be safely acted upon,
and that it is thus acted upon in all business arrangements of the
country. But there is a difference in principle between the two
cases . . . it results from the fact that the messages are first
written by the sender, and are again written by the operator at the
other end of the line, thus causing the inquiry as to which is the
original. The original message whatever it may be must be produced,
it being the best evidence; and in case of its loss . . . the next
best evidence . . . It will be seen at a glance that there is nothing
about the handwriting here that could indicate that the message came
from Gould . . . This message might be received as it was sent,
and would ordinarily be acted on in the business of life, but the only
way to prove such a message in a court of law would be to summon
both the intermediate agents or hearers of the messages, and in that
way trace the message from the lips of one party until it was received
in the ears of the other party. Anything short of that would be to
rely on hearsay evidence of the loosest character."
24
From this review of these cases it appears that the so-called
"hearsay" rule of evidence and the "best evidence rule" are strongly
entrenched, business- practice and costs to the contrary notwithstanding.
Taking account of what truth their application secures in these cases,
and comparing it with the costs and rupture of business which they
cause, I merely leave the question whether the administration is eco-
nomical-whether it is worth while? And again I will voice the ques-
tion whether, if there is undue cost or waste, the process of distribu-
tion, marketing, carries it on to the consumer; or does it stop with the
entrepreneur?
The last complaint of the business community which arises in con-
nection with the activity of marketing to which reference will be
made is the misfit with business policies of what I will call the "standard
equipment" of the common law courts for enforcing legal rights. The
' (Italics mine.) Accord Cobb v. Glen Boom & Lumber Co. (igo5) 57 W.
Va. 49, 49 S. E. ioo5; cf. Showalter v. Chambers (1916) 77 W. Va. 72o, 88 S.
E. 1O72; 4 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 2154; Ehrich, op. cit. supra
note 2r, at p. 444.
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attachment or execution process of a common law court strikes where
it may in the effects of the debtor (statutory exemptions excepted).
It exacts the pound of flesh regardless of consequences to the debtor
as an economic or business unit in society. The execution takes no
account of the debtor's future as a going concern. If a retailer, for
example, becomes embarrassed the common law court rules a "race
of diligence" for the vitals of the enterprise.
If it is urged that equity receiverships are available in such cases
whereby the enterprise can be taken under court control and preserved
as a going concern and creditors' claims liquidated without chaos, we
may admit the statement. If we look at figures, however, the state-
ment may lose some of its importance. A survey made by the New
York World of two hundred thirty-three cases of Federal Equity
Receiverships in the Federal Courts of New York, Southern District,
during their operation from January I, 1917 to December I, 1923,
disclosed the following information bearing on the success of the pro-
gram. Although the concerns were taken over as alleged solvent con-
cerns, chiefly embarrassed in their ratio of current liabilities to current
assets: (i) In only 157 of the two hundred thirty-three cases did
the general creditor get payment in full in either cash or securities of
a reorganized company. (2) Thirty-five of the two hundred thirty-
three concerns were reorganized and put back into private operation.
The rest had been, or were being, liquidated at the date of reporting
the survey. (3) In twenty-six cases the general creditor got nothing
although there were assets sufficient to pay administration expenses
in those cases to the amount of $234,000.
Where did the administration costs go? The total allowances and
disbursements authorized and made up to December I, 1923 in the
two hundred thirty-three cases studied were $7,695,498.46, allocated
as follows:
(a) To Receivers ....................... $3,4o5,o86.96
The receivers in most of the cases were
attorneys-and so far as appears the
business executives were still retained
on the pay rolls.
(b) Attorneys to the l eceiver or Receivers (in
some cases more than one receiver was
appointed) .......................... $2,61o,636.83
(c) Other attorneys ....................... 883,780.82
(d) Special trustees ....................... 151,731.49
(e) Appraisers, auctioneers, accountants, engi-
neers ............................... 644,262.36
If the machinery of the bankruptcy court is set in motion the "legal
expenses" of liquidation are notorious.
Thus far I have considered three sources of complaint with our com-
mon law courts which come from the business community: (i)
That the courts are too glutted with untried cases and their procedure
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always has been too'slow and hazardous with technicalities to warrant
obstructing or taking the "teeth" from programs of business men, such
as arbitration, to adjust their own commercial disputes. (2) That
the rules discussed are too expensive, wasteful and devoid of conven-
ience. (3) That there is lack of adequate and economical technique
to adjust rather than "bust" the going concern.
2 5
With this background taken from experience let us look at our
second general question: Are the foregoing rules of the common law
courts the actual "working rules" in the business community? Are
they the rules that concern the entrepreneur throughout the business
week or are they invoked only on an extraordinary occasion when
vengeance is to be had? If such have been, the working rules to date,
is there promise that they will continue to be such in the future?
Let us first notice a few programs that are practiced in the business
community to prevent waste of the debtor as a going concern: (i)
In the case where banks are creditors it is deemed to be too well known
to require evidence that it is their practice to "nurse along" (as has
been stated to the writer) thg honest but embarrassed debtor whose
future may be sufficiently promising. It appears to be their policy
further to wield their economic powerto induce outsiders to comply
with such programs in lieu of their strict legal rights. If the debtor
is to be"wound up" it will be by settlement-agreement if the bank is
a sufficient creditor to control. It appears to be the opinion of bankers
that a creditors' committee functioning outside of the bankruptcy
court is generally more expeditious and less expensive than bankruptcy
court administration. Whether the banks should have the big stick, or
whether they should wield it are questions which are not here con-
sidered.2 6  I am merely undertaking to state facts to indicate what are
some of the working rules in the business community.
We may refer briefly to another manifestation of the same program.
I refer to wholesale grocer associations sponsored by the National
Credit Men's Association. I will mention the New Haven Branch.
The New Haven wholesalers are associated for their mutual protection
in their dealings with retailers, and with respect to outsiders. The
secretary is a "tickler" on the credit standing of the retailers. If a
retailer becomes financially embarrassed and an outside creditor dips
into the business with an attachment and is insistent upon his legal
position, his claims may be purchased if the debtor and his business
prospects warrant. If not, he will be liquidated, normally in the
bankruptcy court. The writer is informed that there are two or three
of such cases annually. On the other hand, if the wholesalers alone
" If it has been concluded that the process of marketing carries the costs and
wastes to the consumer, still the entrepreneur has cause for complaint which
is more than for mere inconvenience. That he bears the interim risks of
passing on the losses to the market would not be denied.
' It is not intended by so passing over the subject to minimize its importance.
See, Frankfurter and Landis, Bankers and the Conspiracy Law (Jan. 2r, 1925)
NEw RiPUBIZc, 218.
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are involved, or can control the situation, the writer is informed that
their practice is to "carry him along" and let the retailer work out his
indebtedness in his business under such creditor supervision as may be
prescribed. In this connection I will quote from the by-laws of the
Association: "Paragraph II. The Object: The object of this organi-
zation shall be to protect and promote the financial interests, of its
members by preventing failure when possible and by co-operating in.
bankruptcy cases in which its members are concerned, and it is under-
stood and agreed that in case attachment or other proceedings are neces-
sary locally for the protection of the assets of any debtor, such action
shall be taken through the attorney of this organizition for the benefit
and in the interest of all members of the organization.
2 7
A similar, but more comprehensive, program is likewise sponsored by
the National Credit Men's Association. In eighty-five commercial
centers, located in thirty-five states and the District of Columbia, the
association has organized what are called Adjustment Bureaus. The
aims and objects of these bureaus are set forth in part, as follows:
"i. To investigate, upon request, the affairs of a debtor reported
to be insolvent and to adjust the estate, when possible, without court
proceedings.
2. To secure capable and efficient receivers, appraisers, or trustees
when court proceedings are found to be necessary.
3. To secure quick adjustment of all honest failures at the minimum
cost and with the maximum dividend to creditors. 28
Concerning the efficiency of these bureaus the following is quoted
from a recent writer on the subject: "It is but natural that insolvent
estates should be liquidated to better advantage by creditors than by
a court and individuals' who have nothing at stake. Adjustment
bureaus usually have skilled appraisers and competent attorneys and
merchandising men to place in charge of the affairs of insolvent debtors.
In addition, they keep in touch with special avenues through which
merchandise inventories can be disposed of regularly to greatest
advantage. The charges seldom exceed 7 per cent. of the amount dis-
tributed as dividends, except where special services of an unusual char-
acter are rendered. Average returns to creditors from friendly liquida-
tions conducted by the bureaus compare very favorably with amounts
secured through bankruptcy proceedings, the former varying from 50
to 6o per cent., whereas the latter approximates 25 to 30 per cent. on
the average. In many instances, dividends distributed by the bureaus
have amounted to the full amount of the claims. Even in bankruptcy
cases the presence of the bureaus has resulted in higher dividends and
in more economical administration."
29
'By this paragraph it is understood that priorities gained by any member's
attachment shall be waived in the interest of all the members.
' (i9o6) Bulletin, National Association of Credit Men.
'Beckman, Credits mid Collectiots in Theory aM Practice (1924) 389, 390.
At p. 391 the author cites the following case handled by the Adjustment Bureau
492 '
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These programs would seem to indicate a purpose of the business
community to preserve distributing or marketing units as going con-
cerns if feasible; othefwise to liquidate by non-court action. They
appear to be in substitution for strict legal rights. That a given pro-
gram is motivated by selfish interest of the banker, wholesaler or manu-
facturer is a plausible inference. The purpose at hand, however, is
merely to point out the existence of the programs.
Finally, what is going on in the business community, if anything, to
ward off the losses of commercial litigation as they appear to obtain in
the common law courts ?30 I will merely enumerate some facts bear-
ing upon the development of commercial arbitration. Although in
several trades it has been the accepted program. for adjustment of intra-
trade disputes for a considerable time (in the silk industry, for
example, since 1898) the program has gained most momentum with
the procurement of the New York Arbitration Statute which became
effective in New York April i9, 192o. After no little expenditure of
time, effort, and money, the New York Chamber of Commerce, urged
on by the London Chamber of Commerce, procured a statute declar-
ing "a new public policy" in New York whereby the dead hand of
Vynior's31 case was vanquished. The statute nullifies the legal power
of parties to break their agreements to arbitrate. Since that time the
program has spread rapidly. Of. the larger aspects of the program I
will refer to the following. In June, 1923, the New York Merchants
Association circularized about one thousand commercial firms in the
City of New York to pledge themselves to insert an arbitration agree-
ment in their commercial contracts. Eight hundred seventy-nine agreed
to do so; four refused, principally on the ground that they never had
any lawsuits. As to subsequent developments in that organization I
have no figures. There has also come about the organization of a
New York membership corporation, .The Arbitration Society of
of the Chattanooga Association of Credit Men. There were 482 creditors,
many of whom lived at a distance; their claims against an insolvent aggregated
$2o,7oI.68. The writer concludes: '"... the liquidation ...involved an expen-
diture on the part of the bureau of 2 per cent. of all claims, the case was kept
out of the courts, and the creditors have already received at the time of this
writing 65 per cent. on their claims."
'The amount of these losses has been stated as follows: "The aggregate
economic loss to the nation through the necessity of referring to courts the trial
of disputes arising in the course of trade would stagger imagination if it could
be accurately computed both as to actual cost and to the indirect drain upon
national resources. Next to war, commercial litigation is the largest single item
of preventable waste in civilization. The physical inability of the organs of
legal machinery to cope with the mass of litigation that is waiting for adjust-
ment; the costliness and elaborateness.of proceedings; the latitude that permits
unscrupulous litigants to defer final judicial action at an incalcuable injury to
honest business-all these elements combined form so great a handicap to the
prompt and economic administration of justice as to defeat its ends in many
cases." Commerce Reports of Oct. 13, 1924 (published by the Bureau of Foreign
and Domestic Commerce) 67.
'Supra note i6.
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America, the present membership of which is made up of over twelve
hundred firms which are in or near New York City or have representa-
tives in New York City.3 2  Membership dues are devoted primarily to
-"selling arbitration" to the business community of the country. Its
representatives are now engaged in installing standard contracts with
arbitration provisions therein in something over one hundred separate
trades in and about New York City. The Society also affords arbitra-
tion facilities for its own members and outsiders.
But promotion of the program is not localized to New York. The
New York statute has been copied in New Jersey. Again, sponsored
by more than one hundred twenty-nine Chambers of Commerce, Boards
of Trade, producers, wholesalers' or retailers' associations throughout
the United States, a Federal bill, copied in general after the New
York statute and affecting interstate and foreign trade and commerce,
has been introduced into the United States Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives. Further, a Uniform State Arbitration Act has been drafted
by the Conference of the American Bar Association on Uniform
Laws.3 3
How is the program working where it has been tried? As for the
Arbitration Society's tribunal which has been actively functioning as
such for less than one year, over five hundred cases have been adjusted.
The writer has been informed that only one case has, been discovered
where the award has been attacked in court. The Secretary of the
Committee on Arbitration of the New York Chamber of Commerce
has reported on the program as follows: "Our experience with the
arbitration of claims has been a rather curious one. It is that the
arbitration clause not only prevents litigation but also arbitration, and
as such it represents a remedy which works both ways satisfactorily-
preventive as well as curative. This experience has been duplicated
' The membership includes such concerns as: American Sumatra Tobacco
Co., B. T. Babbitt & Co., Doubleday, Page & Co., Fidelity and Casualty Co.,
Huyler's, and Moody's Investors' Service.
' The writer is informed by Mr. William E. Britton, a member of the Com-
mittee, that the proposed Act will be reported to the American Bar Association
for consideration at its 1925 meeting. The Act is drafted along the lines of the
New York statute, except that the agreement to arbitrate is irrevocable only
when made with respect to "any controversy existing between them at the time
of the agreentent to submit." This is copied from the Illinois law. By the
New York and New Jersey statutes, and in the Bill introduced into Congress
to provide for a Federal Arbitration statute, such arbitration contract is irre-
vocable and refers to "a controversy thereafter arising" -as well as to "a sub-
mission hereafter entered into of an existing controversy." It appears to be
the sense of the Committee that to make the agreement to arbitrate irrevocable
with respect to future controversies arising out of the transaction would work
injustice upon such business men as might sign an agreement not knowing that
it contained an arbitration provision. Such position is not immediately plausible.
It should be determined on evidence whether modern business men need such
protection against themselves. The assumption that "more justice" is available
from the orthodox commercial lawsuit than from an arbitration should also be
supported by fact.
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by the Manchester (England) Chamber of Commerce." 34 But does
it? I will only quote the following report of the general counsel of
the Moving Picture Industry:
"Fourteen or fifteen months ago we started to put into effect arbitra-
tion. There were first organized in thirty-one key distributing centers
of the United States, in thirty-one cities (I will not stop to name them),
Film Boards of Trade, composed of the Branch Managers of each dis-
tributing company doing business in that particular city. Each of
these Film Boards of Trade selected or elected three Managers of three
companies, alternating from time to time, to sit upon an Arbitration
Board, composed of six members for that key distributing center. The
other three members were selected by the exhibitors or theater owners
of that same distributing zone in like manner, and these six men con-
stituted the Arbitration Board with the provision for and the right to
select a seventh arbitrator or an umpire in case of a tie vote. Thirty-
one of these Arbitration Boards in these same thirty-one key distribut-
ing centers, wherein are located the thirty-one Film Boards of Trade,
were thus constituted,
"A Uniform Exhibition Contract was agreed upon by many of the
distributors, and I think I am conservative in saying that today nearly
all distributors of motion pictures are using contracts providing for
arbitration, and probably ninety per cent. of the contracts that are being
written today contain these uniform provisions for arbitration. There
has naturally been some speculation as to what figures will be shown
as the result of arbitration in this "infant industry" for its. first
year, .. .
"During our first year of arbitration (or to be a little more accurate,
one Board is about ten months old, some are eleven months, one year,
thirteen and fourteen months because they were not all organized on
the same day, but approximately a general average for one year), these
Arbitration Boards have heard, decided and disposed of more than
five thousand cases. The figures of the New York City Arbitration
Board alone show more than five hundred cases disposed of during
this period of time. I am referring now to cases actually heard and
disposed of by Arbitration Boards and not the number of cases that
were disposed of by reason of the fact that both parties to our con-
tract were obligated to arbitrate, brought into touch with each other,
encouraged to sit down calmly and discuss their difficulties-and I may
say here that three or four times as many cases, probably five times as
many cases, were disposed of in this manner before they were actually
brought before the Arbitration Boards, than were disposed of by, Arbi-
tration Boards themselves. The percentage of unanimous decisions in
these five thousand cases was a fraction better than ninety per cent.
In less than ten per cent. of these cases the votes were five to one or
four to two, and in twenty-one cases only in the United States-
" Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman Committee on Arbitration, New York
Chamber of Commerce, in a letter of Dec. 3, 1924 to the author of this article.
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although we have no provision for appeal and arbitration decisions are
final-in twenty-two cases only was the seventh arbitrator called in,
and five of these cases were in the City of New York.
"The money savings in distribution costs during this period of time
can be most conservatively set at one and one-half million dollars."
"The industry has only two lawsuits pending in the United States."' 5
An enumeration of the specific advantages which are claimed for
the program may be added:
I. The program is inexpensive:
For the silk industry the Silk Association of America maintains
an Arbitration Committee and tribunal primarily for arbitration of
intra-trade disputes. Its by-laws provide that "each arbitrator's fee
shall be $io a sitting and the award shall decide who shall pay the
expenses and fees of the arbitrators." If both parties are non-members
"a charge of $25 will be made for the arbitration services of the Associa-
tion" in addition to the arbitrator's fees.
The American Spice Trade Association provides for an arbitration
tribunal primarily for intra-trade. disputes. The Arbitration Com-
mittee is elected by the members of the Association to adjudicate con-
troversies and the committee "shall receive no remuneration, fees, or
consideration whatever for their services."
In the New York Building Congress an arbitration tribunal is pro-
vided with provision for arbitrators' fees as follows: "If they are to
be paid, a stipulation of the amount must be made at the beginning of
the hearing." A fee of fifty dollars is required "for arbitration in the
arbitration court of the Congress . to be borne equally by the
parties."
The Arbitration Society of America charges the parties ten dollars
for the use of a room and leaves the arbitrator's fees to bargain between
the parties. In a case before that tribunal, with which the writer is
familiar, a Chicago manufacturer asserted a claim of ten thousand
dollars against a New York jobber. The latter alleged a counterclaim
of over forty-five thousand dollars. The arbitration costs amounted
to ninety-five dollars for each party. One hundred fifty dollars of
this went to one arbitrator; the other two were business men who
charged nothing.
2. The program is convenient for the parties in interest:
In the case last referred to the arbitration proceedings were set for
a date that would meet the convenience of the Chicago man who at
that date was to be in New York in his regular course of business.
In an arbitration of a dispute arising out of a building contract, pro-
ceedings were had on Saturday afternoon for the accommodation of
a large number of sub-contractors who were parties in interest.
'Taken from the report of an address before the Arbitration Society of
America in New York City, May 6, x924.
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3. The program is expeditious:
In no case of arbitration of a commercial dispute which has come
to the notice of the writer has the trial lasted more than six hours.
In the Chicago case above referred to the dispute between the parties
appears to have developed on or about November 16, 1923. The case
was arbitrated and settlement made according to the award on March
20, 1924.
In a case arising between a New York distributor of moving picture
films and an out-of-the-state exhibitor, a dispute concerning a four
thousand five hundred dollar balance of a contract involving nearly
seventeen thousand dollars, was adjusted by the New York Film
Board within three weeks after it arose.
4. The program is simpie of administration:
Parties generally appear in their own behalf. Rules of evidence are
administered according to the understanding of the business community.
Books of account have their business standing. The arbitrators are
chosen by the parties because of their technical training and familiarity
with the business out" of which the subject matter of the dispute
arises. Matters of technical detail need not be proved at the trial. In
a case with which the writer is familiar, the seller was an Iowa packer;
the buyer a New York City retailer. Seller delivered to buyer frozen
beef tongues which were later discovered to be non-edible. Seller
claimed purchase price. Issue: Were the beef tongues edible when
delivered? The arbitrator who was chosen was an expert in the meat
business. He procured in advance of hearing certain certificates of
inspection of this meat executed at various times and places by various
Federal inspectors as required by the United States Department of
Agriculture. These certificates appeared to be controlling evidence
as to the quality of the beef tongues when received by the buyer.36 The
arbitrator "knew how," and presumably saved time and expense.
5. The program tends to preserve good will among the disputants:
It is believed that the following excerpt from the letter of the seller
to the buyer in the beef tongue case above cited is typical of the busi-
ness man's valuation of the program: "In our conversation in your
office of the tenth instant you expressed yourself as being agreeable
to arbitration of the matter, and to get it over with in a friendly way.
We suggest that we make use of the Arbitration Society of America,
whose offices were at 115 Broadway, New York City. We are in-
formed that they handle all the details, make all the arrangements, and
put the business through in proper form and with dispatch, and the
entire cost to each party of the controversy is only $io.oo." This
letter was written on June 13, 1924; the case was arbitrated on August
"For the liberal view of the New York Supreme Court toward similar action
by the arbitrator see Berizzi Co. Inc. v. Krausz (1924, ist Dept.) 2o8 App. Div.
322, 203 N. Y. Supp. 442.
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5, 1924 with costs, to each party of twenty-two dollars fifty cents, the
arbitrator's fee being twenty-five dollars. The claim was for $238.76.
6. The program assures such privacy of trial as the parties may
desire:
In disputes, for example, which have concerned alleged defaults of
practicing physicians in cases involving women patients, this advantage
of the program has been attractive.
This advantage, together with elimination of costs and delays in-
cident to court litigation-to say nothing of a community psychology
that lawyers can no longer "exploit" the laymen-are apparently
bases for reason to expect considerable development of this program
in adjusting disputes other than intra-trade disputes.
The dub the program as one of "radicals
'3 7 is little short of ridicu-
lous. If the judical system of the political state is now in competition
with another system devised by merchants let marginal utility deter-
mine their relative values. Conceivably the legal profession will be
instructed in the economic status of its existence.
38
This program is of particular importance in" appearing just at the
time when judges and lawyers are engaged in a "restatement" of the
law as that term has been defined. The question directly arises: Can
the judicial system of the political state and the legal profession main-
tain their position even with many present rules of law "restated" ?39
" See Levy, Prompt Trial of Cases without a Jury (Feb. 5, 1925) N. Y.
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The following is quoted from (Jan. 1925) 2 Arbitration News, 2:
"In a case decided by Supreme Court Justice Wagner early in the current month
[Matter of Kayser (Skulnik) N. Y. L. Joun. (Jan. '4, 1925)] one of the parties
to an agreement to arbitrate refused to appear before the Arbitrator unless his
legal counsel also was permitted to appear with him, and a motion was made to
compel his appearance with books and records and unrepresented by counsel.
In making its decision, the Court said in part:
'This presents for the first time in the courts of this state, so far as research
has been able to enlighten me, the question whether parties to an arbitration may
have counsel represent them as a matter of right. My view is that whether
counsel may be heard or participate in the arbitration proceedings rests entirely in
the sound discretion of the arbitrators. The very purpose of arbitration is to
obtain inexpensive, expeditious and final determinations of disputes on the merits,
free from technical rules and legal formalities. As a rule arbitrators are laymen,
unacquainted with legal principles and procedure. The presence of counsel forti-
fied with 'that wilderness of single instance' and with legal maxims and some
legal anachronisms would tend rather to confusion and protraction than prompt
decision. Besides, if one side .employs counsel a burden is cast on the other to do
likewise, with resulting added expense. To permit participation by counsel as a
matter of right would be fatal to the efficacy of arbitration. Motion is granted.
Settle order on notice.'
Under the rules of the Arbitration Society of America, lawyers may participate
in arbitrations either as arbitrators or as the representatives of disputants. Every
disputant under these rules has the right to be represented by counsel if he so
desires, although his lawyer must conform to the strictly non-technical procedure
in letter and in spirit."
"Since this article was set in type, it has been reported that the Federal arbitra-
tion bill has been unanimously passed by the Senate and House of Representatives
with the unfortunate amendment that it applies only to controversies in excess of
$3,0oo. New York World, Feb. 15, 3925, p. 2.
